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Psychology is the rollercoaster of the sci-
ences. In its brief history, psychology has 
swung through many -isms, alternately 
embracing and rejecting the widest variety 
of assumptions and ﬁ  rst principles. In the 
decades ahead, psychology is once again fac-
ing metamorphoses, in its tectonic collision 
with neuroscience. This changing landscape 
is of profound signiﬁ  cance for psychology, 
transforming the very idea of the discipline 
as well as providing new opportunities and 
challenges for many of its historical and 
contemporary offshoots and subﬁ  elds.
In one sentence, the grand challenge fac-
ing psychology is simply this: What will the 
discipline of psychology be in the year 2020, 
in 2030, and beyond? (These decades are 
not so far away.)
Accordingly, the ﬁ  rst challenge is deﬁ  ni-
tional: What is psychology? Setting aside the 
dictionary deﬁ  nitions and their academic 
reiﬁ  cations, what at this point is the proper 
topic of psychology as a science? Is sub-
sumption into the neurosciences the appro-
priate terminus, or will psychology stake out 
an autonomous domain of hypotheses and 
theories? If the latter, what will be the meta-
physical and methodological commitments 
of the autonomous discipline, distinct from 
both brain and the antiquated soul? This 
existential question has several variants:
•  In clinical psychology, what will remain 
of the concepts of mental health and 
illness? How will the constructs of self 
and other, choice and will, and the other 
core ideas of mental integrity, play out 
in the years ahead? How should the 
classiﬁ  cation schemes of clinical psy-
chology evolve? Patients and clinicians 
both appeal to folk psychological con-
structs in describing the experiences of 
healthy and ill individuals. How should 
folk-inﬂ   ected concepts (like pain, 
depression, happiness, etc.) change?
• In cognitive psychology, what will 
“cognitive” denote? Computation 
  served as model and metaphor for 
half a century. Will computation com-
fortably settle into the mold of neural 
networks? Will neural network models 
ﬁ  nd a useful and informative middle 
ground between biological realism and 
loosely constrained abstraction?
• In developmental psychology, how 
does an emerging understanding of 
the developing brain affect models 
and theories of psychological growth? 
How does the genomic revolution 
reconﬁ  gure the relationship of innate 
and environmental inﬂ  uences in deve-
lopment? Since the brain never stops 
changing, how will concepts of deve-
lopment ﬁ  nd application at every stage 
in human life?
•  In social psychology, how will neuro-
science (as theory and as folk metaphor) 
reconstitute the social world? Will tech-
nologies like “brain reading” and cloud 
computing transform human relation-
ships and institutions?
•  In comparative psychology, the decades 
ahead will offer many opportunities 
to consider non-Western conceptions 
as alternative frameworks for a neuro-
scientiﬁ  cally informed psychology. Will 
alternative conceptions of health and 
illness, modes of mental activity, rela-
tions of mind and body, etc., emerge 
as more appropriate descriptors in 
psychology?
In addition to the biological turn in 
the classic subdisciplines of psychology, in 
recent years several new theoretical direc-
tions have emerged, not necessarily tied to 
the upwelling of neuroscience. These have 
enriched the ﬁ  eld, but are neither static nor 
outmoded. These overlapping and interact-
ing themes should also be considered in 
their millennial form:
•  Phenomenology: The project of “natu-
ralizing phenomenology” offers the 
prospect of new explananda and some-
times new strategies of explanation in 
psychology. What methods and issues 
from phenomenology might inform 
a new psychology in the golden age of 
brain science?
•  Embodiment: From several directions 
in recent years, driven by both philo-
sophy and empirical science, the physi-
cal and bodily setting for behavior has 
emerged as a crucial constraint on any 
model of psychology. How does embo-
diment revise the concepts and methods 
available to a scientiﬁ  c psychology?
•  Ecological Psychology: Just as psycho-
logy depends on the body, both brain 
and body exist in a rich actual envi-
ronment; the perceptual psychology 
of Gibson and his followers challenge 
every theory in perception to accom-
modate to “ecologically valid” settings. 
Can this research program illuminate 
issues and ideas in new ways in this era 
of cognitive neuroscience?
•  Evolutionary Psychology: The ultimate 
context for psychology is evolutionary; 
describing and explaining behavior 
as adaptation might reorganize the 
discipline of psychology, and root it in 
genetics. Will evolutionary psychology 
ultimately conform to the frameworks 
of other branches of psychology? How 
will the bridge from gene to brain to 
behavior ultimately be constructed?
Psychology is changing with these new 
inﬂ   uences and conﬂ   uences. So also are 
several cognate disciplines, each of which 
faces its own challenges of deﬁ  nition and 
direction. These cognate disciplines can 
also cross-fertilize psychology, and cognate 
reconﬁ  gurations should be considered in 
their broadest psychological implications:
•  Cognitive literary studies: The act of 
writing and reading, refracted through 
the genres of poetry, narrative, etc., and 
further refracted through the prac-
tices of diverse times and cultures, 
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 welcomed in every discipline. How can 
its beneﬁ  ts be extended, and its limita-
tions superseded? Are there   trade-offs 
among speed and rigor, exploration 
and conﬁ   rmation, speculation and 
proof? How can the entire process of 
knowledge creation be made more 
transparent?
There are journals already dedicated to 
each of the domains and issues above. The 
Frontiers journals operate at the frontiers of 
all of them, but, more important, a Frontier 
journal can cross frontiers. This is especially 
important in conceiving the challenges and 
opportunities at the frontiers of theoretical 
and philosophical psychology. In the decades 
ahead, the subdisciplines and theoretical 
outlooks in psychology will be   illuminated 
by creative borrowings of questions and 
  methods across disciplinary lines. This 
  network of inﬂ  uence implicates the natural 
sciences, social sciences, and humanities in 
the future of psychology. The grand  challenge 
is to seize this grand opportunity.
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•  New methods in other disciplines will 
also affect psychology. Most conspi-
cuously, the genetic contribution to 
behavior promises to loom large in 
the years ahead. Will psychology ﬁ  nd 
a complete grounding in genomics? Is 
this a suitable goal for a scientiﬁ  c psy-
chology? As genetics progresses, how 
should classic debates on the innate 
and the learned be revised as the 
etiology from gene to brain to beha-
vior ramiﬁ  es? At a more general level, 
how will reductionism transform the 
concepts and explanatory strategies 
that might be deployed? Are reduc-
tionism and eliminativism necessary 
partners?
Finally, just as neuroscience has begun a 
crossing from pure to applied science, with 
implications for ethics, all of the poten-
tial transformations questioned above 
can alter the place of psychology in soci-
ety. The emerging ﬁ  eld of neuroethics will 
have its psychological cognates. Put brieﬂ  y, 
who owns the sciences of mind? Should 
research subjects, both patients and volun-
teers, become involved in research as more 
than just its object? In a world where policy 
is increasingly driven by science (or ought 
to be), what is the obligation of scientists 
to inform and educate general audiences? 
How should non-scientiﬁ  c constituencies 
shape the direction of research?
•  One important dimension of this que-
stion involves the trend toward open 
source publication. This has been 
  discipline in itself. Does this approach 
to literature point to new issues and 
concepts for psychology overall?
•  Cognitive musicology: Like story- telling, 
music making seems to be universal in 
the human community (and rare among 
other species). Music might reﬂ  ect basic 
functions of mind and brain; can the 
cognitive science and neuroscience of 
music illuminate broader issues in psy-
chology as well?
•  Cognitive studies of religious belief: 
Religious belief and practice cut across 
psychology with examples of behavior 
and cognition that defy ordinary rules 
of logic and practical reasoning. In 
their exceptionality, can religious beha-
viors reshape ideas about psychological 
processes in “rational” animals?
Transformations in its subdisciplines 
and movements always implicate the basic 
research methods and methodologies of 
scientiﬁ   c psychology, indicating another 
dimension of challenge and opportunity.
•  Questions of method in contemporary 
psychology have been exponentiated by 
stunning advances in technology and 
technique. What are the implications of 
increasingly powerful measuring devi-
ces, their intricate observations, and the 
accompanying computational speed and 
capacity? Are there new methods that 
should be tested against the issues above? 
What is the appropriate relationship 
between hypothesis conﬁ  rmation  and 
data exploration in a data rich world?